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Cancer-Based Employment Discrimination: Whether
the Proposed Amendment to Title VII Will Provide
An Effective Anti-Discrimination Remedy
INTRODUCTION
More than 800,000 individuals in the United States are diagnosed annually
as having cancer, and of this number approximately 400,000 will be cured.'
Yet employer ignorance concerning a cancer patient's ability to perform a
job, or an employer's belief that employees with a cancer history will lead
to higher insurance premiums, 2 results in discrimination. For example, the
American Cancer Society estimates that approximately 90% of all cancer
patients encounter employment discrimination when they re-enter the work-
force after treatment.'
Despite the extent of cancer-based employment discrimination, very few
laws effectively protect the rights of the cancer victim.4 A Congressional
bill, the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act of 1985, 5 aims to combat
this inadequacy by amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 to
include employees with a cancer history as a protected class.7
If enacted as an amendment to Title VII, the bill will become part of an
anti-discrimination effort that has the advantages and disadvantages of twenty
years of interpretation.' A basic presumption of the bill is that both em-
1. Employment Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the Handicapped: Hearings
on H.R. 1294 Before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985), at 2 [hereinafter Hearings].
2. Tarr, Cancer Patients Confront Job Bias, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
3. Hearings, supra note 1, at 4.
4. Tarr, supra note 2, at 1.
5. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5.
6. Public L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1982)).
7. The proposed amendment to Title VII provides in relevant part that:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer, employment agency
or labor organization to:
(A) require, as a condition of employment, an employee or prospective employee
with a cancer history to meet medical standards which are unrelated to job
requirements or to require such an employee or prospective employee to submit
to a medical examination or reveal any medical information unless such exami-
nation or information is necessary to reveal qualifications essential to job per-
formance; or
(B) reveal any confidential medical information concerning such an employee
or prospective employee without the express written consent of such employee or
prospective employee.
See Hearings, supra note 1, at 3.
8. Hearings, supra note I, at 23 (prepared statement of the Legal Aid Society of San
Francisco).
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ployees with a cancer history and those unencumbered by the disease should
have an equal opportunity to participate in the productive labor force. Yet
the method by which this equality can be achieved is a subject of dispute
when viewed in the context of previous Title VII litigation.9
This Note will illustrate the need for an amendment to Title VII to protect
the employee with a cancer history, and will then attempt to set out an
effective standard for determining how discrimination should be defined
under the proposed Act. Part I will survey the current case law as it pertains
to cancer-based employment discrimination, indicating the need for uniform
legislation. Part II will analyze and discuss the proposals and statutory
language of the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act itself, illustrating
both the breadth and inherent limitations of the bill's coverage. Part III will
critique the proposed legislation, indicating the need for a more expansive
discrimination standard. Although the bill contemplates both an equal op-
portunity and a reasonable accommodation model of employment discrim-
ination, it fails to mandate the measure of institutional accommodation
necessary to effectively integrate the cancer survivor into the workforce.
Finally, this Note will attempt to correct the shortcomings of the bill as
drafted by proposing an alternative statutory definition of employment dis-
crimination, one that will put an explicit obligation on the employer to
accommodate the special needs of an employee with a cancer history.
I. ThE CURRENT STATUS OF CANCER-BASED
EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION
Five million Americans in the United States presently have cancer or a
history of cancer. 0 Of these five million patients, three million have passed
the five-year mark of their diagnosis without relapse, which medical au-
thorities consider clinically cured." Yet 90% of these employees will en-
counter discrimination when they re-enter the workforce. 12 The type of
discrimination confronted by the cancer patient takes on a variety of forms,
ranging from job denial, wage reduction, and exclusion from and reduction
in benefits to promotion denial and outright dismissal. 3 The problem is
9. Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. IuL. L. Rnv. 39.
10. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 6 (statement of Mario Biaggi, representative in Congress from the State of New
York).
Work related discrimination can be classified into three categories:(1) The most serious includes dismissal, demotion, discontinued health care and/
or life insurance, reassignment of hours or location of work, or no salary increases
as given to other employees.
(2) Work problems arising from attitudes of co-workers, e.g., shunning, mim-
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especially prevalent among blue-collar workers. A University of California
study of 345 cancer patients returning to work concluded that 84% of the
blue-collar workers, as well as more than 50% of the white-collar Workers,
suffered some form of cancer-based discrimination. 14
Despite the extent of cancer-based job discrimination, few laws adequately
protect the cancer victim. 5 To date, only two states, California16 and Ver-
mont,17 have legislation which specifically prohibits cancer-based job dis-
crimination. On the federal level, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides
limited protection to "otherwise handicapped" federal employees, employees
of federal contractors and employees of federally funded companies and
organizations. 8 Since its enactment, however, much controversy has sur-
rounded the issue of whether the Act's coverage extends to rehabilitated
cancer patients who do not have a resulting physical impairment which
icry, overt hostility.
(3) Problems stemming from workers' own attitudes, anxieties, defensiveness,
fearfulness about how they should be perceived by others which has led to
avoidance or alienation by co-workers.
See F. FtmAN, EMiPLOYMENr IssuEs, CoNcEus AND ALTERNATIVES FOR CANCER PATENrs 15-
19 (1982).
14. Kotulak, Cancer Patients Face Bias on the Job and in School, Chicago Tribune, Dec.
5, 1985, at 2, col. 3. Additionally, the California division of the American Cancer Society
commissioned a study of 810 cancer patients randomly selected throughout the state. Patients
aged from 20 to 70 years were interviewed 6 to 24 months after their cancer diagnosis, a time
delay which eliminated some of the more lethal cancer sites such as leukemia and lung cancer,
where death frequently intervened before the interview.
The study found that the more a patient earned at the time of cancer diagnosis, the more
likely the patient would be working after treatment. Only 3% of those earning more than
$25,000 per year were not working after diagnosis, in contrast to 7% of the $15,000-425,000
group and 11% of the less than $7,500 group. See GREENR EiG AsSOCIATES, REPORT ON Tim
SOCIAL, EcoNoMIc AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDs oF CANCER PATIENTS IN CALIFORNIA: MAJOR
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS (1979) cited in Hearings, supra note 1, at 17.
15. Hoffman, Employment Discrimination Based on Cancer History: The Need for Federal
Legislation, 59 TMa. L.Q. 1, 14 (1986).
16. In California, the Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. Gov. CODE § 12921 (West
1981) states: "The opportunity to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination
because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medical
condition, marital status, sex or age is hereby recognized and declared to be a civil right."
The Act defines "medical condition" as "any health impairment related to or associated with
a diagnosis of cancer for which a person has been rehabilitated or cured, based on competent
medical evidence." Id. § 12926(F).
17. Similarly, Vermont's Fair Employment Practices Act, as amended in 1981, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (1985), prohibits discrimination on the basis of a physical or mental
condition. "The term physical or mental impairment includes but is not limited to such diseases
and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, ceberal palsy, epilepsy,
... cancer . . . ." Id. § 495(d)(7).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 504 provides in relevant part:
No otherwise handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by
reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by an
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
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substantially limits "major life activities." 19 Unfortunately, this issue has
not yet been resolved by the federal courts. 20
In the absence of an effective state or federal remedy, plaintiffs have been
filing cancer-based discrimination claims in state courts under state laws. 21
Only four of these cases have produced court rulings, and the results have
been mixed. Although two of the suits filed have been successful, 22 state
19. As indicated by the Illinois Supreme Court in Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants,
Inc., 89 Ill. App. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270 (1982), the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does
not specifically include cancer in its list of handicaps. The Act defines the term "handicapped
individual" as any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities (ii) has a record of such impairment,
or (iii) is regarded as having such impairment. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(1982).
The only place in the Act where cancer is mentioned is in § 706(13), where the Act defines
severe handicaps. The Act provides that the term "severe handicap" means "any disability
which requires multiple services over an extended period of time and results from amputation,
blindness, cancer .... 29 U.S.C. § 706(13) (emphasis added).
Although cancer itself is not defined as a handicap, this section indicates that it may result
in a disability severe enough to be covered by the Act. This section offers narrow protection,
however, because only a small percentage of cancer survivors are left with a disability that
requires multiple services over an extended period of time. Hoffman, supra note 15, at 11.
20. Clearly, the "regarded as having such an impairment" language in the definition of
"handicapped individual" is more applicable to the cancer survivor. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(iii) (1982). The regulations that accompany the Act note that people with a cancer history
often experience employment discrimination based on a misconception about their illness long
after they are fully recovered. The regulations provide that:
'Has record of such an impairment' means that an individual may be completely
recovered from a previous physical or mental impairment. It is included because
of the attitude of employers, supervisors and co-workers toward that previous
impairment may result in an individual experiencing difficulty in securing, retaining
or advancing in employment. The mentally restored who have heart attacks or
cancer often experience such "difficulty.
41 C.F.R. § 60-741.54 App. A.(1984) (emphasis added) cited in Hoffman, supra note 15, at
12.
Thus, as the regulations provide, when an employer regards an employee's cancer history as
an "impairment which substantially limits one or more of" the employee's "major life ac-
tivities," regardless of whether the employee is actually impaired, that employee should be
considered a "handicapped individual" under the Act. Id.
This conclusion, however, remains unsupported by judicial interpretation largely because
many cancer patients are reluctant to pursue their discrimination remedy under the Rehabilitation
Act in federal courts. One author found that only 1.3% of all complaints filed under the
Rehabilitation Act between 1974 and 1978 involved cancer patients. Barofsky, Job Discrimi-
nation: A Measure of the Social Death of the Cancer Patient, in PROCEEDINGS OF WESTERN
STATES CONFERENCE ON CANCER REHABILITATION 146 (1982), cited in id. at 13. The reasons
why many cancer patients do not file discrimination suits include an uncertainty over the
applicability of state and federal laws, an exhaustion of physical and financial resources and
a desire to avoid further attention on personal health history. Id.
21. Tarr, supra note 2, at 1.
22. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. New York Psychoanalytic Inst., 22 FAIR EmL. PRAC. DEc.
(CCH) § 30, 764 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 21, 1980) (holding that a New York psychoanalytic
institution's denial of admission to a woman with Hodgkin's disease solely because of her
cancer history violated the New York Human Rights Law); Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. De-
partment of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 344 (Wis.
Cir. Ct., Dane County, Nov. 2, 1976) (holding that acute lymphocytic leukemia qualifed as a
handicap under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act).
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handicap statutes on the whole provide the cancer patient with an inadequate
form of relief. Recourse to this type of remedy imposes a disturbing irony
on the employee with a cancer history. Although most cancer patients return
from surgery or treatment with no particular handicap or disability,2 they
must nevertheless attempt to prove a disability in order to be entitled to
state protection. 24
The Illinois Supreme Court ruling in Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants,
Inc.Y illustrates this dilemma. In Lyons, the defendant employer dismissed
the plaintiff from her job as a kitchen manager after she was diagnosed as
having cancer of the uterus. Lyons brought suit under the Illinois Constitution2
and the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act,27 alleging that she
was dismissed because her employer had learned of her cancer and that the
discharge was a discriminatory action based on her employer's perception
of her as "handicapped."
To show that she was still capable of carrying out her employment re-
sponsibilities, the plaintiff stated in her complaint that her physical condition
had no effect on her ability to perform her job. It was this admission,
however, which proved fatal to the plaintiff's case. Adopting the definition
of "handicap" as earlier construed by the Illinois Court of Appeals in
Advocates for Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,2 the court held
that a handicap under the Act is limited to "that class of physical and
mental conditions which are generally believed to impose severe barriers
upon the ability of an individual to perform major life functions." 29
The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, reasoning:
The Plaintiff has not alleged that her cancer has hindered her in any of
these [major life] activities or any other activities that her employer
perceived her condition as causing a hindrance. In our judgment, she is
23. A recent study indicates that most employees are able to return to their jobs after cancer
treatment without hinderance. 78.8% of the women and 70.6% of the men were physically
able to resume employment. See Bond, Employability of Cancer Patients, 74 RocKY MTN.
MED. J. 153 (1977).
24. Galvin, Cancer as a Protected Handicap in Illinois, 60 CIH-KEINT L. Ray. 715, 722
(1984).
25. 89 Ill. App. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270 (1982).
26. The 1970 Illinois Constitution Article 1, section 19, states, "All persons with a physical
or mental handicap... shall be free from discrimination unrelated to ability in the hiring and
promotion practices of an employer." ILL. CoNST. art. 1, § 19 (1970).
27. The Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act similarly provides:
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual ... because of such individual's physical or mental handicap, unless
it can be shown that the particular handicap prevents the performance of the
employment involved."
IL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 65-23 (1982).
28. 67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1978).
29. Lyons, 89 Ill. App. at 165, 432 N.E.2d at 272.
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not handicapped within the meaning of the Illinois Constitution or the
Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act.30
A similar determination was made by the Illinois Court of Appeals in
Kubik v. C.N.A. Financial Corp." In that case the plaintiff, who had been
employed by the defendant for a number of years, developed a malignant
tumor on his colon. After the tumor was successfully removed, the plaintiff
returned to work only to be told by the personnel manager that the company
would not employ anyone with his "handicap" irrespective of his qualifi-
cations and capacity to perform the employment duties required of him. 2
Although Kubik was judged physically unfit by his employer to maintain
his position with CNA, his alleged "handicap" was not severe enough to
afford him protection by the courts. As in Lyons, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that a medical condition
consisting of a malignant tumor, successfully removed, failed to assert a
"handicap" within the meaning of the Illinois Equal Opportunities of the
Handicapped Act."33
The Illinois handicap statute thus provides the cancer victim with a largely
ineffective remedy. In California, however, cases brought under the Fair
Employment and Housing Act3 4 have had more favorable results. The Act
specifically protects the cancer victim by expressly providing protection for
individuals with a "medical condition" or "any health impairment related
to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer, for which a person has been
rehabilitated or cured, based on competent medical evidence." '35
In compliance with the statute, the Fair Employment and Housing Com-
mission has recently made a notable ruling for employees with a cancer
history. The case, Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Kings-
burg Cotton Oil Company 6 was brought by Virginia Austin, an employee
of the defendant, who had been discharged from her position as a receptionist
and saleswoman after twenty-three years of service.
In 1975, Austin underwent emergency surgery in which eighteen inches of
her colon were removed due to cancer. Over the next five years she had
subsequent bouts with the illness. Although the evidence at trial established
that Austin was not absent more than any other employee in the office and
30. Id. at 167, 432 N.E.2d at 274.
31. 96 Ill. App. 3d. 715, 422 N.E.2d 1 (1981).
32. Id. at 716, 422 N.E.2d at 2.
33. Id. at 718, 422 N.E.2d at 4.
34. CAL. Gov. CODE § 12921 (West 1981).
35. Id. at § 12926(f). As noted earlier, Vermont's Fair Employment Practices Act, VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 495 (1985), similarly provides protection for the employee with a cancer
history. No decision regarding cancer-based employment discrimination, however, has been
decided under the statute.
36. Nos. FEP 80-81, C7-058 ase, N-19090, 84-30 (Cal. Fair Empl. & Hous. Comm'n. Nov.
16, 1983) [hereinafter Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co.].
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was able to complete all of her work assignments, the defendant dismissed
her in 1980 on the grounds of "excessive absenteeism. ' 37
The Fair Employment and Housing Commission found that Austin was
terminated in violation of the Act. The evidence established that Austin was
not dismissed on grounds of absenteeism, which was used as a mere pretext,
but as a result of the defendant's belief that Austin's health would continue
to be impaired in the future. 8 Ruling that the" 'medical condition' provision
of the Act is designed to provide protection for those who no longer suffer
an extant health impairment but are perceived as being so impaired, ' 39 the
FEHC found that the defendant had unlawfully discriminated against Austin.40
The differing results in Lyons, Kubik and Kingsburg indicate the need for
uniform federal legislation to protect the employee with a cancer history.
As one commentator notes, the legal remedy available to a cancer survivor
depends more on the happenstance of his residence than on the nature of
the discriminatory act.41 Consequently, uniform and equitable treatment of
the cancer survivor is contingent on the passage of a uniform remedy, the
most plausible being an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.42
Since its enactment in 1964, Title VII's historic achievement in eradicating
employment discrimination has resulted largely from a legislative willingness
to develop a realistic understanding of labor market conditions and to create
practical solutions to equality problems. 43 Title VII, as originally proposed
in 1963, was enacted to combat the pervasive problem of racial discrimination
in employment." The Act was further amended in the 1970's in reaction to
society's social and economic needs. For example, in 1972 the Act was
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id. at 20.
39. Id. at 21.
40. Id. Discrimination is established under the Act if a preponderance of the evidence
demonstrates a causal connection between the plaintiff's medical condition and the termination
of employment. Based on the evidence, the Commission concluded that the plaintiff had made
out a prima facie case of employment discrimination, stating:
We are convinced by a preponderance of the evidence established that by late
1980, respondent knew Austin was in remission, but not cured, and it was dis-
pleased with her history of cancer related absences. It wrongly perceived that
Austin was absent more than other employees would continue to be because of
her cancer, and these were all substantial factors in its decision to terminate her
employment. We find that respondent terminated Austin's employment because
of her medical condition and thereby discriminated against her in violation of the
Act.
41. Hoffman, supra note 15, at 32.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1982).
43. EEOC Compliance Manual, No. 83, Title VII at 20, 18 (1985).
44. Commentators generally acknowledge that the primary purpose of Title VII was to
eliminate racial discrimination in employment. See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law-
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAxv. L. REv.
1109, 1113-14 (1971); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. Rnv. 59 (1972).
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amended to impose upon employers an obligation to accommodate the
religious needs of their employees. 45 The Act was further modified in 1978,
again in response to society's changing needs. To combat the problem of
exclusion of women from the workforce,4 the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act 47 clarified that the Act's proscription against sex-based employment
discrimination included discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.48
An expansion of Title VII is again necessary to combat the employment
discrimination problem of the 1980's: exclusion of the cancer survivor from
the workforce.4 9 A basic concept of our legal system is that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.: Accordingly,
under traditional equal protection analysis, classifications based on sex, race,
alienage or national origin are inherently suspect and subject to judicial
scrutiny. 51 A legislative classification will be stricken as "patently arbitrary"
where it bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.12
As noted by the Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed.53
A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike?-
The main concern of the Supreme Court in scrutinizing arbitrary classi-
fications has been to root out any action by government which is "tainted
by a prejudice against discrete and insular minorities," or "the sort of
prejudice which tends ... to curtail the operation of political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities" in our society."5 In
determining whether a group has a discrete or insular character, the Supreme
45. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 2(7), 86 Stat.
103, 102 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e(j) (1982)).
46. Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE
L.J. 929 (1985).
47. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e(k) (1982))
[hereinafter PDA].
48. The PDA amends Title VII's definitional provision, and reads in relevant part:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
49. Like cancer, the AIDS epidemic has also spawned a multitude of job problems. A
discussion of employment discrimination as it pertains to AIDS victims, however, is beyond
the scope of this Note.
50. Weber v. Aetna Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
51. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
52. Id. at 683.
53. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
54. Id. at 76.




Court has often stressed the link between a history of prejudice, the existence
of an immutable characteristic determined solely by accident of birth, and
the presence of suspect employment criteria. These factors are considered
so unlikely to relate to any legitimate government purpose that their disad-
vantageous use by the government probably indicates a desire to disadvantage
a politically weak or unpopular group.16
The presence of a history of discrimination and the use of suspect criteria
in determining a cancer patient's ability to perform in a job indicates that
employees with a cancer history have taken on the discrete and insular
minority status shared by other victims of employment discrimination. More-
over, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the existence of an immutable
characteristic shared by all members of the group is not a necessary pre-
requisite for heightened judicial scrutiny. For example, alienage discrimi-
nation is subject to strict judicial scrutiny even though alienage, unlike race
or sex, is not an unalterable trait.57
Thus, the differential treatment of cancer survivors indicates that they are
entitled to the same specialized treatment and heightened scrutiny afforded
to members of other minority groups.5 8 Public and private employers continue
to discriminate against employees with a cancer history, although corporate
and professional studies, as well as thousands of case histories, have shown
that people with a cancer history are as productive in the labor force as
individuals unburdened by the disease.5 9
Moreover, despite the relative lack of litigation in the area of cancer-based
employment discrimination, 60 the discrimination problem confronted by can-
cer patients is likely to get worse before it gets better. 6' Due to a greater
incidence of curable cancers and the discovery of more successful treatments,
more cancer patients are surviving today than ever before.62 As a result,
more cancer patients are returning to the workforce. Nearly eighty percent
of the people diagnosed with cancer in 1985 were capable of remaining in
their jobs or returning to work after therapy.63 Twenty-six percent of those
56. L. TUmE, AMmcAN CoN~sTITUmONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1053 (1978).
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
59. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 4.
60. Lawyers believe that the reason why few courts have had to deal with the issue of
cancer-based job discrimination is in part because many patients recovering from the disease
are reluctant to sue, but also because very few laws clearly protect workers with a cancer
history. See Tarr, supra note 2, at 1.
61. Id.
62. The American Cancer Society estimates that five million people in the United States
have cancer or a history of cancer. This is a 66% increase over five years ago. Furthermore,
of the five million, three million have passed the five year mark which medical authorities
consider clinically cured. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (testimony of Mathew Martinez,
representative in Congress from the State of California).
63. Kotulak, supra note 15, at 2.
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who wanted to return to work, however, were unable to because of em-
ployment discrimination. 64 An amendment to Title VII which will include
employees with a cancer history as a protected class is the only way cancer
survivors can uniformly fight such discriminatory employment practices.
II. THE CANCER PATENTS EMPLOYMENT RiGHTS ACT
Recognizing that "flegislation to outlaw employment-based discrimination
is long overdue, '65 Congressman Mario Biaggi introduced the Cancer Pa-
tients Employment Rights Act before the Subcommittee on Employment
Opportunities on February 27, 1985, in an effort to eliminate future em-
ployment discrimination against cancer survivors. The express objectives of
the bill are (1) to discourage discrimination against an individual based on
the individual's cancer history, (2) to encourage employers to make reason-
able accommodations which assist employment of an individual with a cancer
history, (3) to increase the employability of an individual with a cancer
history, and (4) to encourage further legislation designed to prohibit dis-
crimination against such individuals in areas other than employment dis-
crimination.67
To achieve these ends, the bill proposes to amend Section 701 of the Civil
Rights Act of 196468 to include persons with a cancer history as a protected
class. The statute as amended would read:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions
or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, or "cancer history."6'
64. Id.
65. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Mario Biaggi, representative in Congress
from the State of New York).
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1982). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it a proscribed practice
for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment ... or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). The Act also proscribes discriminatory employment practices
by employment agencies (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)) and labor organizations (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(c)).
69. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 3. The bill provides that "[s]ections 703(a)(1), 703(a)(2),
703(b), 703(c)(1), 703(c)(2), 703(d), and 703(e)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
are each amended by striking out "or national origin" each place it appears and inserting in
lieu thereof "national origin, or cancer history."
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Under the proposed bill, victims of cancer-based discrimination would
have the same private right of action currently available to victims of race
and sex discrimination under Title VII. All present administrative proceed-
ings of the Equal Opportunities Commission would apply to cases of cancer
discrimination, along with all established remedies under Title VII, which
include back pay, reinstatement and attorney's fees. 7 0
A. Protected Class
The term "cancer history" is defined in the bill as the status of any
individual who either has or had cancer or is diagnosed as having cancer.
7 1
The bill thus covers three classes of claimants: (1) those who have cancer,
(2) those who once had cancer, but at the time of their claim are free of
uncontrolled growth or the spread of abnormal cells, and (3) those who do
not have cancer but are erroneously perceived to have or have had cancer.7 2
The protection afforded under the bill, however, is subject to the following
limitations. First, employees are not protected if they are "unable to perform
the job requirements in a manner which would not endanger the safety" of
others whether or not the employer can alleviate any safety problems through
70. Hoffman, supra note 15, at 21-22.
71. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 2. Section 3(a)(1) of the bill provides: "[t]he term 'cancer
history' means the status of any individual who has, or has had cancer, or is diagnosed as
having, or having had cancer. For the purposes of this subsection the term 'cancer' means
'any disease characterized by uncontrolled growth and spread of abnormal cells.' "
72. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 22. It should be noted, however, that a literal reading
of the bill's language indicates that the bill extends its protection only to those employees who
have cancer or a history of cancer. Thus, one commentator disagrees with Hoffman's conclusion
by contending that the bill's language does not extend to those employees erroneously perceived
to have or have had cancer. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 23. (Prepared Statement of the
Legal Aid Society of San Francisco). Consequently, an employee who is discharged because
his employer erroneously believes rumors that he has cancer would not fall within the scope
of the bill's protection. Id. Moreover, it is unlikely that the bill would protect employees with
precancerous conditions from employment discrimination since they presumably do not have,
had, or ever have been diagnosed as having cancer. Thus, a woman with a family history of
cancer who needs close monitoring of her condition because she is at risk of developing cancer
would not be protected under the bill. Id.
A simple reconstruction of the provision as drafted could avoid these adverse results. Under
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. Gov. CODE § 12920 (West 1981),
employees are protected from discrimination "related to or associated ... with cancer." The
statute's language, which enlarges the scope of the Act's protection, has enabled California
law to protect individuals who have precancerous conditions or "active cells" as well as those
who are perceived by their employer as having a history of cancer.
Consequently, by using the California Statute as a model, the present definition of cancer
history can be statutorily reconstructed to more effectively carry out the overall purposes of
the bill, as follows:
The term "cancer history" means the status of any individual who (1) has or had
cancer; (2) is diagnosed as having cancer; (3) or is regarded as having a disease
related to or associated with cancer.
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reasonable accommodations. 73 Second, individuals who do not present any
safety problems, but who cannot be accommodated without causing the
employer undue hardship, fall outside the bill's protection. 74 Finally, em-
ployers covered by the proposed Act are the same as those presently covered
by Title VII: public and private employers, employment agencies and labor
organizations. 75
B. Definition of Discrimination
The bill aims to shield this class of claimants from employment discrim-
ination in two ways: (1) by prohibiting the use of medical standards unrelated
to job performance as a criteria of employment and (2) by placing the
employer under an obligation to reasonably accommodate the needs of the
cancer victim.
First, the bill holds that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer, employment -agency, or labor organization "to require as a
condition of employment, an employee or prospective employee with a cancer
history to meet medical standards which are unrelated to job requirements. ' 76
Consequently, an employer may not demand that a current or prospective
employee meet medical standards that surpass, or are unrelated to, the
physical demands of the job. An employee will be compelled to reveal a
medical history only if the employer can demonstrate that such information
is essential to job performance. Thus, the proposed Act would prevent
employers from requiring all job applicants to fill out comprehensive and
detailed medical histories unless such information directly relates to the
employee's ability to properly and safely perform the job. 77
Second, the proposal places the employer under an obligation to reasonably
accommodate the needs of the cancer victim. The bill states that it shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to fail to make a good
faith effort to explore whether reasonable accommodations may be made
73. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 22; Hearings, supra note 1, at 23 (prepared statement
of the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 3. Section 3(c)(1) of the bill states: "It shall be unlawful employment practice
for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization to -
(A) require, as a condition of employment, an employee or prospective employee
with a cancer history to meet medical standards which are unrelated to job
requirements, or to require such employee or prospective employee to submit to
a medical examination or reveal any medical information unless such examination
or information is necessary to reveal qualifications essential to job performance,
or
(B) reveal any confidential medical information concerning such an employee
or prospective employee without the express written consent of such employee or
prospective employee.
77. See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 32.
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for an employee or prospective employee with a cancer history which would
enable the employee or prospective employee to fulfill the job requirements
.... ,"78 Factors relevant to the determination of reasonableness include
consideration of administrative costs, costs of the physical accommodations,
cost of disruption of existing work practices, the size of the employer's
business and the safety of existing and potential employees.7 9 The obligation
to accommodate, however, is not without limitation. As the bill provides,
an employer may refuse to hire, discharge or classify employees on the basis
of their cancer history if he is able to demonstrate that he is "unable to
reasonably accommodate an employee or prospective employee" to enable
that person "to fulfill the job requirements without undue hardship to the
employer." 0
C. Limitations of the Bill's Coverage
The Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, as presently drafted, appears
to provide the cancer victim with an effective means of combatting discrim-
ination. It protects those employees who have, had or are perceived as having
cancer and holds that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to require as a condition of employment that an employee meet
medical standards unrelated to job performance. The effectiveness of the
bill in fact, however, depends largely upon judicial interpretation of its
statutory language. As this Note will illustrate, the bill's current definition
of employment discrimination frustrates the overall purposes of the Act.
The bill provides the cancer survivor with a cause of action on both disparate
treatment and disparate impact grounds."' It neglects, however, to set forth
an effective reasonable accommodation obligation. Unless an employer is
under an affirmative duty to accommodate the special needs of an employee
with cancer who requires further treatment after re-entering the labor force,
otherwise neutral employment practices will have a disparate impact on this
group of cancer survivors.
78. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 3. Section 3(c)(3) of the bill states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail to make
a good faith effort to explore whether reasonable accomodations may be made
for an employee... with a cancer history which would enable the employee
or prospective employee to fulfill the job requirements. Whether an accomoda-
tion is reasonable shall be determined according to the facts and circumstances
of the particular case. Factors relevant to the determination of reasonableness
include administrative costs, cost of the physical accomodations, the cost of
disruption of existing work practices, the size of the employer's business, and
the safety of existing and potential employees.
79. Id.
80. Id. See also Hoffman, supra note 15, at 23.
81. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Using Title VII case law as a source of illustration, the following analysis
will show the weaknesses in the bill's statutory language. This Note will
attempt to overcome these deficiencies through statutory reconstruction of
the Amendment's language. To assist in this endeavor, alternative provisions
outlined in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,2 principally the H.E.W. Regu-
lations which govern its implementation, 3 will be used.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE CANCER PATIENTS
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT
The overall purpose of the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act is to
insure that employees with a cancer history have an equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in the productive labor force. The method by which this equality can
or should be achieved, however, is a subject of disagreement when viewed
in the context of previous Title VII litigation."'
Discrimination against an employee with a cancer history as defined in
the bill has three possible definitions: (1) intentional discrimination (disparate
treatment), which refers to willful discrimination by an employer, such as
a refusal to hire someone because of their cancer history; (2) discrimination
by effect (disparate impact), which broadens the violation to include the
impact of an "otherwise neutral" employment practice if it adversely affects
the cancer victim; and (3) the accommodation rule, which further broadens
the violation of discrimination by effect by requiring the employer to rea-
sonably accommodate the special needs of the cancer victim short of ex-
periencing undue hardship."5
Unless the bill is modified to require a mandatory reasonable accommo-
dation standard of employment discrimination, many cancer survivors will
be unable to successfully participate in the productive labor force. An anti-
discrimination model which provides for mere equal employment opportun-
ities, as provided by a cause of action on disparate treatment and disparate
82. 29 U.S.C. § 701-79 (1982).
83. 25 C.F.R. 84-12.
84. See generally Kay, supra note 9; Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Hand-
icapped and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 997 (1984); Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 CoLtm.
L. REv. 690 (1983).
85. See Ingram & Domph, An Employer's Duty to Accomodate the Religious Beliefs and
Practices of an Employee, 87 DicK. L. REv. 21, 32-33 (1982) (religious discrimination under
Title VII similarly has three possible definitions).
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impact grounds, is an inadequate remedy for many cancer survivors. Em-
ployers must be under an obligation to not only treat cancer survivors equally
but to make efforts to remove barriers which stand in the way of otherwise
qualified applicants and employees.87 Providing accommodations such as
rearranging work schedules for radiation treatments or allowing time off for
doctor and hospital visits is a crucial aspect of integrating the cancer patient
into the working world. Thus, effective legislation must contain mandatory
accommodation.
A. Ambiguity of Statutory Language
As drafted, the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act provides different
methods for determining how discrimination should be defined under the
bill. The relevant provisions state:
3(c)(1) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer,
employment agency, or labor organization to:
(A) require, as a condition of employment, an employee or prospective
employee with a cancer history to meet medical standards which are
unrelated to job requirements, or to require such employee or prospective
employee to submit to a medical examination or reveal any medical
information unless such examination or information is necessary to reveal
qualifications essential to job performance.88
3(c)(3) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
fail to make a good faith effort to explore whether reasonable accom-
modations may be made for an employee or prospective employee with
a cancer history which would enable the employee or prospective em-
ployee to fulfill job requirements.89
86. The Supreme Court distinguished the two causes of action in International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The Court observed that claims of disparate
treatment may be alleged where:
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive
is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment ....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress
"disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of
discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate impact
theory.
87. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 23 (Statement of the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco).




The first proposal, section 3(c)(1), when taken together with Title VII,
mandates an equal opportunity model of employment discrimination.90 It
provides the cancer survivor with a cause of action on disparate treatment9'
and disparate impact 92 grounds. Under this model, cancer patients will not
be singled out because of their disability, but rather treated the same as
other employees based on their ability to work.93 An employment practice
or policy which intentionally excludes employees with a cancer history would
therefore be presumptively discriminatory. 94 Similarly, an otherwise neutral
employment practice, such as the use of medical examinations before hiring,
would violate the bill if it was unrelated to job performance and had a
disparate effect on the number of employees with a cancer history actually
hired.95
Under the second proposal, section 3(c)(3), an employer is under an
obligation to make a "good faith effort" to accommodate the needs of the
90. This viewpoint complies with traditional disparate treatment and disparate impact anal-
ysis, where the courts have adopted a system of inferences that mere denial of equal opportunity
constitutes actionable discrimination where alternative explanations, such as lack of qualifi-
cations, are not established. See Wegner, TheAnti-Discrimination ModelReconsidered: Ensuring
Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 69 CoRNELL L. REv. 401, 438 (1984).
91. The Supreme Court has divided the process of proving a disparate treatment case under
Title VII into three steps. A prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination can be
established by a plaintiff who shows: (1) that he belongs to a category of persons protected
by Title VII, (2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants, (3) that despite his qualifications he was rejected, and (4) that after his
rejection the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons with plaintiff's qualifications. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973).
92. Although the plaintiff need not establish intent in disparate impact cases, the Court
has established a somewhat similar three-part framework of analysis:
To establish a prima facie case of [disparate impact] discrimination, a plaintiff
must show that the facially neutral employment practice had a significantly dis-
criminatory impact. If that showing is made, the employer must then demonstrate
that "any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in
question," in order to avoid a finding of discrimination. Even in such a case,
however, the plaintiff may prevail, if he shows that the employer was using the
practice as a mere pretext for discrimination.
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (footnote and citation omitted)).
93. See Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 Coum. L. REv.
690, 699-702 (1983) (where the author contrasts two similar models of equality between the
sexes: assimilationism, which stresses the likeness of the sexes, and pluralism, which places
greater weight on the distinctiveness between men and women).
94. For example, the United States Military (Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, Reserves
and service academies) automatically rejects people with a cancer history for active duty
positions. Chapter two, sections 2-40 and 2-41 of Army Regulation 40-501 states, "Causes for
rejection for appointment, enlistment, and induction in the United States Military include
benign and malignant tumors." Such an exclusionary employment policy would be presumptively
discriminatory under the present bill on disparate treatment grounds. See Hearings, supra note
1, at 6.
95. See infra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
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cancer victim. 96 This provision contemplates a reasonable accommodation
model of employment discrimination. Instead of merely providing equal
employment opportunities, the employer must attempt to recognize and
compensate for differences between an employee with a cancer history and
those unburdened by the disease. 97 It requires that the singular disabilities
and needs of the cancer patient be recognized and compensated for so that
persons with a cancer history can participate on terms equal with the rest
of society. 98
B. Inadequacy of the Equal Opportunity Model
For the cancer patient who is expectantly cured after surgery and no longer
requires treatment, section 3(c)(1) provides adequate protection against dis-
crimination. 99 Application of the equal opportunity model, however, is in-
sufficient to protect the rights of the employee who is not clinically cured.
The employee with cancer who is still under treatment or susceptible to a
relapse in the future requires a more expansive anti-discrimination standard,
one which will place the employer under a legal obligation to not only treat
the cancer patient equally, but to affirmatively accommodate his special
needs as well.100
The inadequacy of an equal opportunity approach can be illustrated by
applying disparate impact analysis to the context of cancer-based employment
discrimination. 101 Disparate impact analysis, which was developed largely in
96. See supra note 78.
97. See Note, supra note 93, at 707.
98. See Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, supra note 84, at 1003-07 (1984) (contrasting
two models of equality as applied to the physically handicapped: an equal treatment paradigm,
which requires all persons be evaluated by neutral rules related to job performance and an
equal impact paradigm, which requires benign differential treatment of the handicapped).
99. The bill in its present form, for example, would provide adequate protection against
discrimination for employees with a cancer history who no longer require treatment and are
thus able to meet job requirements in spite of their cancer history. The plaintiffs in the Lyons
and Kubik cases, discussed in Part I of this Note, would fall into this class of cancer survivors.
See supra notes 25-33.
100. The act as drafted does not adequately protect those cancer survivors who are unable
to meet job requirements because of their cancer history. See, e.g., supra notes 36-40 and
accompanying text.
101. Although section 3(c)(1) contemplates both a disparate treatment and disparate impact
cause of action, disparate impact analysis is used here. The language used in the proposal
indicates that it is the discriminatory effect of medical standards unrelated to job performance
on the employee with a cancer history, as opposed to the state of mind of the employer, that
is of concern.
Furthermore, commentators acknowledge that disparate treatment analysis "contains both
mechanical and theoretical difficulties .... In order to prove discrimination-that similarly
situated people are treated differently-a plaintiff has to prove that the employer intended to
discriminate against the plaintiff or the plaintiff's minority group. Since it is illegal to discrim-
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the context of race discrimination, 102 aims to promote the distribution of
jobs on the basis of merit and to eradicate "artificial, arbitrary and unnec-
essary barriers to employment."'' 03 Disparate impact analysis was initially
applied in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,1° 4 where the United States Supreme
Court held that a Title VII plaintiff could make a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that a racially-neutral employment policy or prac-
tice adversely affected a protected group.ios A showing of impermissible
motivation by the employer is not required.'6 A policy's differential effect
is seen to fall within the statutory definition of discrimination.'
7
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,10 s the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant.' °9 The defendant may rebut the plaintiff's case by
inate, and costly if one is caught, in only the most blatant of circumstances will the plaintiff
be able to garner the requisite evidence. Even when there is evidence to gather, it is time
consuming and costly because of the extensive discovery usually needed to feret out proof of
subjective intent. Equally important, discrimination is not always intentional at a conscious
level. Under such circumstances it is unfair and counterproductive to require proof of a motive
that is unnecessary for the action and the harm. The development of disparate impact [analysis]
as an alternative theory has relieved some of the inequities resulting from the above difficulties
by extending the definition of discrimination" to disparate effect. See Note, Disparate Impact
Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MnN. L. REV. 1039, 1041 n.15
(1984).
102. See Kay, supra note 9, at 57.
103. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
104. Id.
105. "[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431.
106. As stated by the Court:
[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-in headwinds" for mi-
nority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability ... Congress directed
the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply
the motivation ....
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
107. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-02 (1973).
108. Disparate impact cases clearly provide that statistical disparity rather than intent can
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Thus, in Griggs black plaintiffs challenged their
employer's use of a diploma requirement and aptitude tests for screening prospective employees
for transfer to higher paying positions where these methods disqualified a disproportionate
number of blacks and were not shown to be related to job performance. Griggs, 401 U.S. at
431.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) applied the disparate impact analysis used in
Griggs to the context of sex discrimination. In Dothard, the plaintiff charged that physical
requirements (minimum of 5'2", 120 pounds) for a job in the Alabama prison system constituted
illegal sex discrimination because over 41 % of all the women were excluded while less than
1 % of all men were excluded. The Court agreed that the facially neutral height and weight
requirements did adversely affect women. It then held that because they were unnecessary for
the job there was illegal discrimination. Id. at 329-32.
109. "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432;
see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
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showing that the selection criteria are "job related" or justified by "business
necessity. '"10 The Court defined this exemption more precisely in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody,"' finding that a prima facie case of illegal discrimi-
nation can be rebutted by proving that the practice in question is job related
and that it directly measures a skill needed for the job.12 Even if the
defendant satisfies his burden, however, the plaintiff will still prevail if he
is able to show an alternative employment practice which would achieve the
same result without the illegal differential impact." '3
In accordance with disparate impact analysis, section 3(c)(1) prohibits the
use of medical information in employee selection, an otherwise neutral job
requirement which could have a disparate impact on the employee with. a
cancer history, unless such information is necessary to reveal qualifications
essential to job performance." 4 The effect of this language is to require
employers to treat cancer survivors and other job applicants and employees
equally, notwithstanding their medical history. This model of equal oppor-
tunity, as set out in Griggs, " 5 works effectively in the context of race
discrimination, where society regards race as a salient characteristic unrelated
to job performance." 6 This standard, however, is less effective in the area
of cancer-based employment discrimination. Unlike race, an employee's can-
cer history may directly affect his ability to perform in a job. An adequate
model of equality for the employee with a cancer history, therefore, must
recognize and take into account the physiological differences and needs
between applicants or employees with a cancer history and all other partic-
ipants. Disparate impact analysis undermines the cancer patient's ability to
participate equally in the workforce on two grounds: (1) inability to meet
initial job requirements, and (2) exclusion from the workforce on grounds
of business necessity.
1. The Problem of Ability
An individual's ability is commonly used as an appropriate neutral basis
for determining his participation in various sorts of programs or activities." 17
Selection criteria are generally used as a means of screening applicants to
110. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32; see also Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d
1267, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1021 (1982). ("Griggs suggests that the
Court perceived 'business necessity' to be the same standard as 'job-related' and viewed both
as requiring only that an employer prove that his employment practices are legitimately related
to job performance...").
111. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
112. Id. at 425-36.
113. Id. at 425.
114. See supra note 76.
115. 401 U.S. at 424.
116. See Note, supra note 93, at 690.
117. Wegner, supra note 90, at 436-37.
1987]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
determine whether they possess the requisite abilities for the job. n8 Although
it has been generally accepted that an individual's ability to meet such criteria
is unrelated to race," i9 the same is not true with respect to the employee
with a cancer history. In many cases, an individual's cancer history will
excuse him or her from participation.
The case of School Board of Pinellas County v. Rateau'20 is an example
of employee exclusion on grounds of inability to meet initial job require-
ments. In that case, the plaintiff Rateau applied for a position as a substitute
business teacher with the defendant school board. Although the plaintiff
was eligible for the position, the board withdrew their offer of employment
on job qualification grounds when they discovered that the plaintiff had a
back condition due to previous surgery to remove a malignant tumor.'
2 1
Ignoring evidence that the plaintiffs cancer history would not affect his
ability to carry out job requirements, 122 and that the school board had never
required a substitute teacher to meet physical requirements in the past,'2
the Florida Court of Appeals affirmed the school board's decision. The
court concluded that the plaintiff's cancer history prevented him from meet-
ing job requirements necessary to teach an elementary business class. The
court failed to even consider whether Rateau's alleged disability could have
been reasonably accommodated, thereby making his employment feasible.1
24
2. The Problem of Business Necessity
Additionally, an employer may be justified in excluding or firing an
employee with a cancer history on business necessity grounds. To carry his
burden, the employer must merely show that an otherwise discriminatory
practice is a reasonable measure of job performance.' 25 Ordinarily, a cancer
118. Id. at 437.
119. For example, Title VII permits employers to consider such characteristics as religion,
sex, and national origin in making employment decisions, provided that those characteristics
are "bona fide occupational qualification[s] reasonably necessary to [the] normal operation of
the particular business or enterprise." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1981); see also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
120. 449 So. 2d 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
121. The Employment Coordinator for the county school system testified that the lifting of
typewriters, computer components and other office equipment was among the job duties required
of a business teacher. Id. at 841.
122. Rateau testified that he had performed similar kinds of activity for a ten-week period
as a substitute teacher in another school district, which involved the lifting of business machines
and "quite a bit of bending," with no adverse effects. 449 So. 2d at 842.
123. 449 So. 2d at 841.
124. -The court sustained the plaintiff's dismissal without considering whether Rateau's alleged
disability could have been reasonably accommodated. Assistance from students and faculty in
performing the manual aspects of the job, for example, would have made Rateau's employment
possible.
125. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
[Vol. 62:827
CANCER-BASED DISCRIMINATION
patient, following treatment, has the necessary qualifications for employ-
ment. The difficult issue surrounding the cancer patient's job status, however,
arises in the context of the future ramifications of his condition. His prior
illness poses certain future risks. Even if an employee can show that he is
able to meet initial job requirements, the employer may attempt to show
that future risks involved in hiring a cancer patient would impose too great
a burden on the employer. In short, the employer may successfully dem-
onstrate that it is a business necessity to avoid hiring or promoting someone
who has a cancer history.126
Employers have used this defense often in the context of handicap dis-
crimination claims, pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973127 and in the area of Title VII pregnancy discrimination suits. The risk
of future injury, for example, may justify an employer's refusal to hire or
maintain an employee under the Rehabilitation Act.1 8 Thus, in E.E. Black,
Ltd. v. Marshall,29 the court reasoned that screening "individuals on the
basis of possible future injury could be consistent with both business necessity
and safe performance on the job."'130 In Black, the plaintiff's congenital
back condition caused him to lose his job as an apprentice carpenter. The
employer contended that the plaintiff's condition would cause back pain and
future injury.' Recognizing that the risk of future injury threatened to
increase the employer's insurance and workman's compensation costs, the
court held that the employer was justified in his refusal to hire the plaintiff.3 2
Employers have also used this defense in the context of Title VII pregnancy
discrimination claims13 3 to justify employment termination or exclusion of
pregnant women requesting extended disability leaves. One court 134 thus
upheld an employer's decision to deny a woman a promotion because of
her pregnancy where the employer claimed as a defense that anyone who
missed as much work as a result of a disability would be treated in a similar
manner. Is
126. Note, Legal Recourse for the Cancer Patient Returnee: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
10 AM. J.L. & MED. 309, 317-18 (1984).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
128. See Note, supra note 126, at 318.
129. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
130. See Note, supra note 126, at 318.
131. Id.
132. 497 F. Supp. 1104. In reaching its conclusion, the Black court identified three factors
which determine when an employer's assertion of future risk will justify employment criteria
that exclude otherwise qualified handicapped individuals. These factors are the likelihood,
imminence, and seriousness of the possible injury. Id. Due to lack of medical evidence, the
court, however, did not apply these standards in this case.
133. See supra note 48.
134. Group Hospitalization, Inc. v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 16
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 561 (D.D.C. 1977). The employer said it followed the same
procedure on a promotion offered to any employee who was leaving for an extended period
of time.
135. Id. at 564-65.
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In Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court,3 6 the court relied on the
same reasoning to find no per se violation of Title VII where a pregnant
woman was not hired for a law clerk position. The court acknowledged that
even assuming the employer's policy had a disparate impact on women, it
was justified by "business necessity."'137 A similar rationale has been used
to ratify pregnancy specific exclusions in the airline industry based on cus-
tomer safety38 and fetal hazard grounds. 139 In Harriss v. Pan American
World Airways,'4° for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a "stop work"
policy requiring pregnant employees to put themselves on unpaid maternity
leave within 24 hours of learning of the pregnancy. The court accepted the
employer's practice on customer safety rationale.'14
Where mere equal opportunity is required, business necessity could be
used as a valid defense in an employer's decision to terminate an employee
with a cancer history. Most recovered cancer patients do not have limitation
of physical or mental capacity, as do many other disabled persons after
treatment. 42 But many will need to take time off for surgery, radiation
therapy, regular doctor and hospital visits, and other forms of treatment. 43
The average length of sick leave per year due to cancer is 108.3 days for
women and 93.3 days for men.' 44 Although job absences are infrequent,
they are usually prolonged. 45 Consequently, an employer with a strict dis-
ability leave policy would be justified under the business necessity defense
to discharge a cancer patient on grounds of excessive absenteeism. '6 Simi-
larly, under the rationale advanced by the Black court' 47, the potential for
increased insurance costs may be a valid reason for either refusing to hire
or terminating employment. Since identical treatment of cancer survivors
136. 537 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mo. 1982). But see Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660
F.2d 811, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (where the court was more narrow in its view of business
necessity even where the position was only for a limited period of time).
137. Id. at 214.
138. Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984); Harriss v. Pan American World
Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
139. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
140. 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
141. Id. at 613, 676-77.
142. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 19 (prepared Statement of Dr. Robert J. McKenna,
M.D., President, American Cancer Society).
143. The accepted treatment modalities for the treatment of cancer include surgery, radio-
therapy, chemotherapy, and, on an experimental basis for certain forms of cancer, immuno-
therapy. Because cancer is such a complex and variable disease, each cancer patient is treated
as a unique case. Consequently, the length and type of therapeutic regimen will vary with each
individual cancer patient. A. FRANK, CouRTaooM MEDIcRNM, § 5.00 (1986).
144. See Bond, Employability of Cancer Patients, 74 RocKY MTN. MED. J. 153 (1977).
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text, where the defendant in the Kingsburg
Cotton Oil Co. case attempted to use "excessive absenteeism" as a legitimate grounds for
dismissing the complainant.
147. See supra note 129.
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and those unburdened by the disease will have an adverse impact on the
cancer survivor, use of traditional disparate treatment and disparate impact
analysis, provided by section 3(c)(1) of the bill, is an inappropriate means
of eradicating cancer based on employment discrimination. If equal treatment
in result is to be achieved, the differences between these two groups must
be recognized and taken into account. 48 Reasonable accommodation is re-
quired.
3. The Need for Reasonable Accommodation
As drafted, the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act recognizes a need
for employers to remove barriers that stand in the way of otherwise qualified
applicants. 49 These efforts, which are called reasonable accommodations,
refer to the adoption or modification of a program's design or operation
to facilitate participation by the protected group.5 0 A reasonable accom-
modation standard attempts to recognize and compensate for differences
between the discriminated group and other groups in society. It requires
employers to take whatever steps are necessary to accommodate any dis-
advantages suffered by the protected group so that this class of persons can
compete on a more or less equal basis with other persons151
Although section 3(c)(3) 52 of the bill attempts to define the concept of
accommodation, it does not articulate the type of affirmative obligation
which is required to meet the needs of an employee with a cancer history
for two reasons. First, it fails to set forth a mandatory accommodation
requirement. Section 3(c)(3) merely suggests that employers "explore whether
reasonable accommodations may be made.' ' 53 Second, it falls to articulate
the type of accommodation required. Reasonable accommodation is a term
already contained in the Title VII context, pertaining to discrimination on
the account of religion. The term as interpreted by the courts in that area,
however, has been very narrowly defined. In 1977, the Supreme Court held
that any accommodation which imposes more than a de minimis cost in
wages and efficiency imposes an impermissible hardship on the employer.Y5 4
148. A similar rationale has been applied to the context of discrimination against the hand-
icapped. While the courts have not gone so far as to require equal results in regard to the
handicapped and nonhandicapped, they have viewed the provision of merely identical services
as being discriminatory against the handicapped. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 408-13 (1979) (the provision of equal services may not be sufficient accommodation
of the needs of a disabled person not to discriminate); see also Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp.
171, 206-07 (D.N.H. 1981) (to provide only equal services would "harken back to Social
Darwinism").
149. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 23.
150. See Wegner, supra note 90, at 442.
151. See Note, supra note 98, at 1006.
152. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
153. Id.
154. See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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If a similar de minimis standard was read into the language of the Cancer
Patients Employment Rights Act, the overall purpose of the bill-integrating
the cancer patient into the workforce-would be frustrated.
Alternatively, the regulations governing the application of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 drafted by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW)155 place an expansive accommodation requirement on public
employers of handicapped individuals. The Rehabilitation Act, and its ac-
companying regulations, is designed not only to thwart discrimination in
hiring and firing handicapped individuals, but also to "affirmatively assist
in their career placement and advancement and ameliorate their work con-
ditions through reasonable accommodations.' ' 5 6 An application of this latter
interpretation of accommodation results in an anti-discrimination standard
which both meets the special needs of the cancer survivor and effectively
integrates him into the workforce.
a. The Inadequacy of a De Minimis Standard:
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison
Although the need for accommodation may seem unique to an employee
with a cancer history, it has been widely used in the Title VII context of
religious discrimination. 1 7 Accommodation was initially recognized as a con-
stitutional right when individuals affected by certain facially neutral state
policies demonstrated that those policies adversely affected their religious
freedoms, and that such policies could not be modified without impairing
a compelling state interest. 58 Title VII similarly requires that employers
reasonably accommodate their employees' religious beliefs to avoid discrim-
ination on the basis of religion. 59
The reach of the statute's accommodation requirement, however, is limited
by the provision that such accommodation cannot impose an undue hardship
on the conduct of an employer's business.' 6° Although the language contem-
plates accommodation may result in some hardship to the employer,'6' the
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982), which imposes religious accommodation obligations.
156. Butler v. Department of the Navy, 595 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (D. Md. 1984).
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000efj) (1982), which imposes religious accommodation obligations.
158. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Supreme Court required
South Carolina to modify its employment compensation laws to avoid penalizing persons
unwilling to work on Saturdays because of their religious beliefs.
159: See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) ("The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates he is unable to reasonably
accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.")
160. See id.
161. See Note, Heaven Can Wait: Judicial Interpretation of Title VII's Religious Accom-




amendment does not make clear the exact nature of the balance. 162 Conse-
quently, a definition of the undue hardship standard has been left largely
to interpretation by the courts. 163
The Supreme Court interpreted the undue hardship requirement in Trans
World Airlines v. Hardison,64 where an employer alleged that TWA had
unreasonably failed to accommodate his needs to observe a Saturday Sab-
bath. The airline had refused, in accordance with a collective bargaining
agreement, to assign other employees to cover his shift and had declined to
encourage voluntary coverage by offering premium overtime pay to substi-
tutes. The Supreme Court held that TWA had made reasonable efforts to
accommodate Hardison's religious needs. The Court did not require TWA
to make additional accommodations because the collective bargaining agree-
ment served the legitimate purpose of distributing burdens and privileges in
a way acceptable to both workers and management, 65 and because the airlines
reasonably chose not to finance time off for employees on the basis of their
religious beliefs.1 66 As reasoned by the Court:
To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give
Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship. Like abandonment of the
seniority system, to require TWA to bear additional costs when no such
costs are incurred to give other employees the days off that they want
would involve unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their
religion.... While incurring extra costs to secure a replacement for
Hardison might remove the necessity of compelling another employee to
work involuntarily in Hardison's place, it would not change the fact that
the privilege of having Saturdays off would be allocated according to
religious beliefs. 67
The two principals articulated by the Hardison Court in its interpretation
of the religious accommodation requirement, the priority of seniority rights
over the need for accommodation and the definition of undue hardship as
no more than de minimis cost, places a minimal obligation on the employer
to accommodate. 61 Moreover, the concern with reverse discrimination 69
162. See Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 400 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1971) ("There is no doubt that what constitutes
reasonableness and undue hardship will vary under the circumstances of each case.").
163. See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75 (1977) ("the reach of [the accommodation]
obligation has never been spelled out by Congress").
164. Id.
165. Id. at 77-78.
166. Id. at 84-85.
167. Id. -at 84-85.
168. See A. Larson & L. Larson, Employment Discrimination 92.10, at 19-6 to -17 (1984);
Hill, Reasonable Accommodation and Religious Discrimination under Title VII: A Practitioner's
Guide, 34 ARa. J. DEc. 1979, at 19, 25; Comment, Religious Discrimination in Employment-
The Undoing of Title VII's Reasonable Accommodation Standard, 44 BRooKLYN L. Rav. 598,
620 (1978).
169. See Note, Religious Discrimination and Title VI's Reasonable Accommodation Rule:
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 39 Omo ST. L.J. 639 (1978).
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suggests a view of statutory interpretation that protects and even justifies
only the smallest of efforts by the employer to accommodate his employees'
religious needs. 170
Several courts have strictly adhered to the mandate of Hardison, finding
that any cost, even to a large employer, is likely to impose an undue
hardship.' 71 One court, for example, found that an employer's unsuccessful
one and a half hour effort to reschedule an employee's workshift constituted
a reasonable accommodation and more than this would entail undue hard-
ship. 72 Similarly, in Rohr v. Western Electric Inc.,7 1 the court applied the
Hardison rationale, without any reference to the size of the employer's
business, to find that all the alternatives posed by the plaintiff to accom-
modate his religious needs constituted undue hardship, especially where the
imposition of a nonstandard work week would be a "threat to the morale
of other employees."' 7 4
If a similar de minimis standard is read into the language of section
3(c)(3) .7 of the proposed Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, any
obligation on the employer to reasonably accommodate the needs of an
employee with a cancer history will be rendered meaningless. Employers
must be under an affirmative duty to provide reasonable accommodation
which may, in some circumstances, require more than de minimis cost. The
HEW regulations 176 which govern the implementation of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 197317 provide this alternative: a more expansive
accommodation standard which may require additional expense without con-
stituting "undue hardship."' 78
b. An Effective Alternative: The HEW Regulations
The Rehabilitation Act was initially passed by Congress in 1972 as a means
of integrating the handicapped into the workforce. Congress intended the
statute to "highlight the parallels between the discrimination suffered by the
170. See, e.g., Howard v. Haverty Furniture Cos., 615 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1980) (where
lost efficiency was found to produce more than de minimis cost). But c.f. Philbrook v. Ansonia
Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 776 (1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 848 (1986) (where school teacher
established prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII with regard to school
board's policy of allowing only three days of paid leave for religious observance and not
allowing three days of paid leave for personal business to be used for religious observance).
171. See Note, supra note 153, at 855. See also TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)
(where court made no reference to actual costs).
172. Turpin v. Missouri-Kan-Tex R.R., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984).
173. 567 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1977).
174. Id. at 830.
175. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
176. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1983).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
178. See Note, supra note 161, at 841 n.16.
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handicapped and other minority groups, manifested particularly through their
segregation from the rest of society.' ' 79 Section 504 of the Act attempts to
achieve this end by prohibiting discrimination against otherwise qualified
handicapped individuals under any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance. 80 Although section 504 does not expressly require re-
cipients of federal funds to spend money to modify programs or facilities
so that otherwise qualified handicapped individuals can use them more
easily, 8' the implementing regulations issued by the HEW construe section
504 to mandate such accommodation requirements. 82
Under the HEW regulations, an employer has a duty to make "reasonable
accommodations" to the known physical or mental limitations of an oth-
erwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless such accommo-
dation would result in undue hardship.18 3 To assist in the determination of
what constitutes reasonable accommodation, the HEW has devised a list of
alternative techniques by which an employee can be accommodated. These
alternatives include restructuring job assignments, providing for part-time
employment and modifying work schedules.'14
The regulations further prescribe a detailed set of factors governing the
determination of whether forcing an employer to provide accommodations
would constitute undue hardship. In arriving at this determination, the
decision-maker must balance the cost of the accommodations against the
size, purpose, structure and budget of an employer's program or business.'
179. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 205 n.119 (D.N.H. 1981).
180. See supra note 18.
181. See Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 881 (1980).
182. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12.
183. Id.
184. Id. The provision states in relevant part:
(a) A recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee
unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of its program.
(b) Reasonable accommodation may include:
(1) making facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
handicapped persons, and
(2) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, the provision of readers or interpreters and
other similar actions.
185. Id. The provision states in relevant part:
In determining pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section whether an accommo-
dation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of a recipient's program,
factors to be considered include:
(1) The overall size of the recipient's program with respect to number of
employees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget;
(2) The type of the recipient's operation, including the composition and structure
of the recipient's workforce; and
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed.
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Although the courts have articulated different views about the level or
cost of inconvenience at which an accommodation becomes unduly burden-
some, 186 several courts have taken an expansive view, holding that section
504 places a significant obligation on the employer to make reasonable
accommodations. Thus, in Nelson v. Thornburgh, 187 the court held that the
refusal of a state agency to provide readers for blind social workers was
discriminatory within the meaning of section 504, despite its substantial
expense. Likewise, in Smith v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs,8' the
court found that the provision of a supervisor and the administration of
frequent blood tests for the employment of an epileptic nursing assistant
was a reasonable accommodation under the Act.
Even though the employee with a cancer history may not require such
extreme accommodation measures to be successfully integrated into the pro-
ductive labor force, the HEW regulations provide a flexible standard for
determining how reasonable accommodation should be defined in the bill.
The HEW regulations avoid the rigidity of a quantitative threshold test, as
evidenced by the de minimis standard, by requiring courts to balance the
employee's needs against the degree of "undue hardship" which the employer
can reasonably absorb. Under this standard, an employer will be under an
obligation to accommodate the special needs of an employee with a cancer
history for radiation treatment, physical checkups and doctor or hospital
visits by modifying job assignments, rearranging work schedules and pro-
viding for part-time employment. Moreover, there is no evidence that such
minimal accommodations will place an undue financial burden on the em-
ployer. To the contrary, one study has actually shown that it is cost effective
for an employer to retain or hire a person with a cancer history. Turnover
rate, absenteeism and work performance of cancer survivors was found to
be comparable to the matched company population. Moreover, the study
concluded that retaining cancer survivors enhanced the morale of the or-
186. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (where unan-
imous Court held section 504 did not require a federally assisted nursing program to admit an
applicant with a severe hearing impairment); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 927 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (offering "light duty status" to the handicapped employees who had not met five year
minimum service requirement would be an undue hardship to the Postal Service because of
losses of efficiency and extraordinary costs); Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332, 342 (N.D.
Cal. 1979) (section 504 would not require a school district to hire an aide for a blind admin-
istrator); see also American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1277-78 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (Dep't of Transportation regulations requiring that all transportation be made accessible
to handicapped would have imposed unduly burdensome costs).
187. 567 F. Supp. 369, 379-82 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
188. 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 986 (C.D. Cal. 1983). See also Crane v. Lewis, 36
Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 31 (D.D.C. 1982) (reasonable accommodation requires Federal
Aviation Administration to provide hearing aid to former employee with hearing impairment
to make re-employment feasible).
[Vol. 62:827
CANCER-BASED DISCRIMINATION
ganization as a whole; the employees knew the employer had a sense of
commitment to his workers.189
4. Statutory Reconstruction: Defining an Appropriate
Reasonable Accommodation Standard
A simple redrafting of section 3(c)(3) 190 can avoid statutory ambiguity in
its interpretation and provide satisfactory guidelines for accommodation. If
the bill is to effectuate the overall purposes of the Cancer Patients Em-
ployment Rights Act it must contain two provisions: first, it must place a
mandatory requirement on the employer to reasonably accommodate the
needs of a cancer survivor; second, it must make clear through the use of
a specific set of proposals that the de minimis standard of reasonable ac-
commodation does not apply to the context of cancer-based employment
discrimination. An effective revision of section 3(c)(3) might read as follows:
3(c)(3) An employer, employment agency or labor organization shall make
reasonable accommodation for the known physical needs of an employee
with a cancer history unless the employer can show that the accommo-
dation would impose an undue hardship.
(a) Reasonable Accommodation shall include (1) job restructuring, (2)
reassignment, (3) part-time or modified work schedules, and (4) other
similar actions.
(b) In determining pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section whether
an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of an employer's business, factors to be considered include:
(1) overall size of the employer's business with respect to number
of employees and size of budget;
(2) the type of the employer's operation, including the composition
and structure of the recipient's workforce; and
(3) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed.
CONCLUSION
Whether an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 will
provide employees with a cancer history with an effective means of com-
batting employment discrimination depends largely upon how the bill's sta-
tutory language will be interpreted by the courts. As presently drafted, the
bill provides the cancer survivor with an anti-discrimination model insuring
equal employment opportunities, while placing only minimal demands on
189. See Wheatly, Employability of Persons With a History of Treatment of Cancer, 33
CANCER 441-45 (1975) (regarding Metropolitan Life Insurance study).
190. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
1987]
856 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:827
the employer to accommodate the cancer survivor's special needs. This Note
demonstrates, however, that an effective anti-discrimination remedy must
call for employers to recognize and take into account the differences between
cancer survivors and other qualified applicants. If equality in result is to be
achieved, legal significance must be given to the physiological differences
and needs of the cancer survivor. Consequently, a reformulation of the bill,
placing a mandatory accommodation requirement on the employer, is nec-
essary if the cancer survivor is to be effectively integrated into the productive
labor force.
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